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Arbitration Clauses in CEO
Employment Contracts: An Empirical
and Theoretical Analysis
Randall Thomas
Erin O'Hara
63 Vand. L. Rev. 959 (2010)
Kenneth Martin
A bill currently pending in Congress would render
unenforceable mandatory arbitration clauses in all employment
contracts. Some perceive these provisions as employer efforts to
deprive employees of important legal rights. Company CEOs are
firm employees, and, unlike most other firm employees, they can
actually negotiate their employment contracts, very often with
attorney assistance. Moreover, many CEO employment contracts are
publicly available, so they can be examined empirically. In this
paper, we ask whether CEOs bargain to include binding arbitration
provisions in their employment contracts. After exploring the
theoretical arguments for and against including such provisions in
these agreements, we use a large sample of CEO employment
contracts to test the several different hypotheses for including such
provisions. We find that only about one half of CEO employment
contracts in our sample include such provisions. What factors might
determine whether CEOs agree to arbitrate their employment
disputes with their companies? We find that CEOs that receive a
higher percentage of long-term incentive pay as a fraction of their
total pay, that work in industry sectors that are undergoing greater
amounts of change, and that have lower long-term profitability are
statistically significantly more likely to have arbitrationprovisions
in their employment contracts. The importance of contextual factors
for arbitrationclauses in CEO contracts indicates that regulation of
arbitrationclauses in employment contracts should be more nuanced
than that found in pending legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
Both executive compensation 1 and the use of arbitration
provisions in employment contractS2 are hot topics in legal scholarship
today. The executive compensation debate revolves around the fight
between shareholders and CEOs over how to divide up the firm's
profits. Critics of the current regime argue that American CEOs are
overpaid because they can dictate the terms of their employment to
boards of directors, 3 while defenders of the system see only a few bad
apples in the barrel. 4
In the employment setting, another argument rages over the
relative power of employees versus employers to select the forum
where they decide their disputes.5 This issue is currently one of the
major concerns in the area of arbitration, where scholars have debated
whether employment agreements are contracts of adhesion that
include arbitration provisions in order to take away important
substantive and procedural rights from employees. 6
As employees, CEOs actively negotiate their employment
contracts, often with the assistance of attorneys. The CEO of the
corporation therefore is an important player in both of these disputes:
on the one hand, she has an important interest as an employee in how
she and the company resolve any potential arguments; on the other
hand, wearing her hat as the CEO, she bargains with the board of
directors of her firm to try to get what she wants in her own
employment arrangements. CEO employment contract provisions thus
shed light not only on disputes between employees and employers, but
1.
See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1 (2004) ("Executive pay has long
attracted much attention from investors, financial economists, regulators, the media, and the
public at large.").

2.

See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration:A New

Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2005) (stating that the employment
arbitration provisions and the Supreme Court's Gilmer decision "spawned a debate that resulted

in a small Amexandrian library of law review articles, a series of Supreme Court decisions,
hundreds of federal and state court opinions, and various state and federal legislative
proposals").
The best example of this argument is BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 80-87.
3.
4.
E.g., John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation
Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1181 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK

& FRIED, supra note 1).
5. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (deciding whether
employers can require union members to arbitrate ADEA claims).
6. Sherwyn et al., supra note 2, at 1563.
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also on the relationship between boards of directors and corporate
executives.
In this Article, we seek to explore both relationships by
focusing on the presence of arbitration provisions in employment
contracts. Critics of such provisions claim that companies prefer
arbitration and therefore use contracts of adhesion to force employees
to give up their rights to litigate job-related disputes. The strong
version of the contracts-of-adhesion theory predicts that arbitration
provisions will appear in all employment contracts because arbitration
is always a better forum for the company. A weaker claim is that while
arbitration is preferable in some circumstances, and litigation in
others, many employees lack the bargaining power to seek the right to
litigate when it is the optimal choice. The arbitration provisions of
CEO employment contracts enable us to look at cases in which
employees with bargaining power negotiate meaningfully over where
to resolve their disputes. This helps inform us about the overall
desirability of arbitration as an alternative to litigation.
CEO employment contracts also cast light on the current
executive compensation debate and its two main competing theories"board capture theory" and "optimal contracting theory." Board
capture theory claims that CEOs dictate the terms of their
employment in negotiations with weak and pliant boards of directors. 7
In terms of arbitration clauses, board capture theory would predict
that CEOs will get what they want from their boards of directors. We
would therefore expect that measures of CEO power, such as whether
boards are weak or whether CEOs have longstanding relationships
with their board, would be important determinants of the presence of
arbitration provisions.
Under optimal contracting theory, the terms of CEO
employment contracts should be dictated solely by economic variables
that reflect the demand for labor, such as firm size, risk, performance,
and growth opportunities.8 If this theory is correct, we would expect
these variables to be significant determinants of arbitration provisions
in these contracts, and other factors such as board composition or type
of CEO to be insignificant.
We use the theories underlying both of these debates to
generate a series of testable hypotheses about arbitration provisions
in CEO employment contracts. Taking a large sample of actual CEO
7. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1.
8. John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen & David F. Larcker, Corporate Governance, Chief
Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. EcON. 371, 375 (1999); Keryn
Chalmers, Ping-Sheng Koh & Geof Stapleton, The Determinants of CEO Compensation: Rent
Extraction or Labor Demand? 6-7 (Jan. 2006), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=460040.
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employment contracts, we then check to see if they do contain such
provisions and, if so, try to explain why. Our first important empirical
finding is that only about one-half of the contracts in our sample
contain arbitration provisions. This contradicts any theory that
predicts that employment contracts should always contain, or always
not contain, such a provision. On these grounds, we find cause to
question the strong version of the contracts of adhesion claim in the
employment arbitration context.
Having found that arbitration clauses are not universally used,
we next formulate a series of hypotheses about why CEOs might
bargain to include, or be willing to include, arbitration provisions in
their employment agreements with their firms. We use our sample of
CEO employment contracts to test these various hypotheses to
determine which ones are supported by the evidence. Using both
univariate and multivariate analyses, we find strong and statistically
significant results that show CEO employment contracts are more
likely to include arbitration provisions in three different situations, all
of which reflect economic variables. First, we find that arbitration
provisions are more likely when the CEOs receive a larger percentage
of their total compensation in long-term incentive-based pay. We posit
that in this situation, arbitration enables the parties to select a
decisionmaker who is an expert in the compensation area, and who
therefore will be better able to calculate the value of a complex pay
package and interpret the potentially difficult contractual terms
governing it.
Next, we find that CEOs in industries that are experiencing
rapid levels of change, such as mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcies, or
liquidations, are more likely to seek arbitration provisions in their
employment contracts. We argue that CEOs at these firms may prefer
arbitration because they perceive it to be a speedier way of resolving
disputes. In industries undergoing rapid transformations, a quick
resolution of disputes is important because the firm's days of existence
as an independent entity may be numbered.
Third, our analysis indicates that CEOs who work at less
profitable firms are more likely to include arbitration provisions in
their employment contracts. We believe that in these situations the
parties are more concerned about the costs of litigation. They perceive
that arbitration is less costly, and reducing costs is very important at
a poorly performing firm. An alternative hypothesis is that when there
are objectively verifiable adverse conditions surrounding the firm, the
parties signal their commitment to the relationship by selecting the
less adversarial process of arbitration over litigation.
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Tying in these results with our earlier discussion of the use of
arbitration provisions in employment contracts, our study indicates
that the presence of arbitration clauses turns on economic factors. In
the context of the contracts-of-adhesion theory, we conclude that while
most employees are unable to bargain for arbitration when those
nuanced factors indicate that it is desirable, a flat ban on arbitration
clauses in all employment contracts may be too blunt a policy tool.
Instead, regulatory policy for employment contracts generally might
attempt to mimic bargained-for employment arbitration by preserving
particular types of employment claims for courts while enabling others
to proceed to arbitration.
Turning to the executive compensation debate, we find no
evidence that measures of CEO power are correlated with the use or
absence of arbitration provisions. Instead, only economic variables that
reflect the demand for labor are significant explanatory variables for
these provisions. This empirical finding is consistent with optimal
contracting theory.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part I
provides an overview of the CEO employment contract negotiation
process and the parties' possible positions regarding arbitration. Part
II examines the scholarship on regulating binding arbitration clauses
in employment contracts. It begins by reviewing prior legislation and
literature on the subject, then it lays out the theoretical justifications
for choosing arbitration (or, alternatively, for preferring litigation) of
disputes under these agreements. Part III analyzes CEO employment
contracts in light of the ongoing debate over whether CEOs have
effectively captured corporate boards of directors or whether boards
optimally contract to set their executives' terms of employment. Part
IV describes our sample of contracts and some additional variables
that we collect to conduct our empirical analysis. Finally, in Part V,
we first formulate and then test a number of different hypotheses
about when arbitration provisions are most likely to appear in CEO
employment contracts. Our tests begin with univariate statistical
analyses and then proceed to multivariate logistic regression analysis.
We conclude with some brief observations.
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I. NEGOTIATING CEO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

Corporate CEOs generally have written employment contracts
with their firms. 9 Sometimes these contracts are negotiated when the
CEO joins the company; other times they are renewed after the CEO
has been employed by the company for several years, or after an
executive is promoted internally from a lower-ranking management
position. Whenever any of these events occur, the company and the
CEO need to negotiate the terms of the employment contract and of
the executive's compensation package.
That process often works as follows. One of the parties makes
an initial proposal, with the main economic terms of its offer set forth
in a term sheet.10 The term sheet, or its oral equivalent, sets forth the
proposed salary, target bonus, equity participation in the company
(stock options, restricted stock, and any long-term incentive plans),
severance package, change-in-control protections, benefits (health
retirement
plan,
deferred
supplemental
executive
plans,
compensation, etc.), and standard perquisites. Any changes to these
items are then negotiated between the executive and the company's
representatives, usually the chairperson and members of the
compensation committee, subject to later approval by the full board of
directors.
Once the final term sheet is completed, counsel for the parties
negotiate the language and legal terms of the employment contract."
When the lawyers sit down to the bargaining table to negotiate the
contract's language, they begin the process of filling in the details not
covered by the earlier substantive agreement. While details of the
economic terms can be very important in these negotiations, 12 our
focus here is on the arbitration clause, if one exists, in the contract.
Keeping in mind that every negotiation is different, we offer a few
generalizations.
9.
This Part draws from prior work by one of the authors. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S.
Thomas, An EmpiricalAnalysis of CEO Employment Contracts:What Do Top Executives Bargain
For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 236-40 (2006).
10. The terms of the initial offer may be determined by the company's human resources
department or by the CEO. Id. at 236 & n.7.
11. In some cases, a term sheet is not used, and the parties go directly to the contract
negotiations as the first written expression of the proposed deal. However, the main economic
terms are agreed to orally prior to the drafting, and the remainder of the process is very similar
to situations where a term sheet is used. Id. at 236-37 & n.8.
12. For example, the principals may agree to a two-year severance package without
specifying what compensation payments and benefits are to be continued during that time
period. From the executive's perspective, it is important that the contract cover not only salary
payments, but also potential bonus payments (and their computation), stock option vesting,
benefits, and other potential continuing financial support.
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First, incumbent CEOs generally have stronger negotiating
positions than incoming CEOs for many reasons, including the fact
that they may have already experienced some degree of success in
running the company and have an ongoing relationship with the
incumbent board of directors. There are two types of incoming CEOs:
inside officers who have been promoted, and executives who have been
brought in from outside the company. Between these two types of new
CEOs, outsiders normally have more leverage in their negotiations
than candidates who are promoted from within the company. These
differences in negotiating strength significantly affect both the
economic terms and the key legal components of the final contract.
The final terms depend on both the relative bargaining power of the
parties and the importance of the clause.
The presence or absence of an arbitration clause is a significant
item that the parties might negotiate. Companies will want to
arbitrate disputes to keep things private and avoid adverse publicity
over a messy termination. Normally, employees want to preserve their
right to a jury trial, calculating that a jury of their peers would be
more sympathetic to them than to the company firing them. However,
CEOs may have good reason to believe that juries will not empathize
with their compensation demands, as the amounts involved may seem
excessive to most members of the public. This may lead executives to
favor arbitration generally, although they will still carefully negotiate
terms such as the selection process for the arbitrators and their right
to appeal from an adverse decision.
II. Do FIRMS IMPOSE ARBITRATION ON EMPLOYEES THROUGH

CONTRACTS OF ADHESION?
In the employment law literature, there is an ongoing debate
about whether companies should be permitted to force employees
through contracts of adhesion to arbitrate all disputes that they have
with their firms. In this Part, we lay out the arguments that surround
this issue and show why they may be less important in the context of
CEO employment contracts. We then assume a world of equal
bargaining power and ask why workers and companies might
nonetheless want to arbitrate disputes, or alternatively, why they
might prefer to litigate them. Since this assumption closely
approximates the CEO's situation in the firm, our answers show why
CEO employment contracts may inform the more general debate about
the desirability of arbitration in employment contracts.
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A. Worker Rights and Arbitration Provisionsin Employment Contracts
Congress enacted the basic provisions of what is now the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1925. The FAA mandates that both
state and federal courts enforce arbitration agreements, with limited
exceptions.1 3 It further mandates that the courts also confirm and/or
enforce arbitration awards at the conclusion of arbitration, again with
limited exceptions.' 4 For several decades after the enactment of the
FAA, however, employment agreements did not contain arbitration
clauses. In fact, many assumed that employment contracts were not
subject to the FAA because the FAA covered contracts "evidencing a
transaction involving commerce,"15 and "commerce" was defined under
the FAA to include all interstate and international commerce except
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."16
Employee/employer disputes were often arbitrated pursuant to
collective bargaining agreements negotiated between employers and
employee unions, but those arbitrations occurred pursuant to the
National Labor Relations Act rather than the FAA. 17 Moreover, even if
the FAA had been understood to permit arbitration of individual
employment disputes, written individual employment contracts were
rare until a few decades ago. 18
During the 1970s, however, courts began to hold that
employment contracts fell within the scope of the FAA. 19 Today,
arbitration provisions in individual employment contracts are
unambiguously within the purview of the FAA, with the exception of
the transportation employees listed in the FAA text quoted above. If
an employment agreement is silent on dispute resolution, then the
parties will be assumed to want their disputes resolved in court. The
parties' assumed preference is consistent with some empirical
evidence. In contracts of adhesion, which are drafted by one party and
imposed on the other, one study indicates that more than 75 percent of
13. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2010) (stating that written agreements to
arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract"). The application of the FAA to state courts was
judicially imposed some time after the enactment of the FAA. STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION §§ 2.6-2.8 (2d ed. 2007).
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11.

15. Id. § 2.
16. Id. § 1.
17. Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitrationand Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
83, 91-94 (1996) (describing legal history of collective bargaining agreement arbitration).
18. Id. at 95-96.
19. Id. at 98-99.
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consumer contracts and 90 percent of general employment contracts
contain arbitration provisions. 20 In contrast, a study of contracts filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission found virtually no
arbitration clauses in credit commitments, underwriting agreements,
pooling and servicing agreements, security agreements, and trust
agreements formed between U.S. parties. 21
Critics of the increasing use of arbitration clauses in
employment contracts provide several arguments against the practice.
They claim that employment contracts are generally adhesion
contracts that cannot be negotiated by the employee. 22 Arbitration can
take away many of the procedural and substantive rights available to
the employee; for example, the use of arbitration can affect the
applicable costs, recoverable damages, statute of limitations, burdens
of proof, and availability of evidentiary discovery. 23 Moreover, many
employment disputes involve statutory public rights, such as the right
against discrimination, and yet arbitration does not provide for public
accountability of arbitration decisions or the development of legal
precedent for future litigants. 24 In the strong form of the contracts of
adhesion claim, employers always want to arbitrate employment
disputes with their employees.
Proponents of employment arbitration argue that arbitration
tends to be both faster and less expensive for employees. 25 Empirical
studies of employment arbitration have not yet resolved the issue of
whether employees fare worse in arbitration than they do in
litigation. 26 Nevertheless, the controversy has generated legislation
20. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts 15 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 08-017; N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-28, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1076968.
21. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante ArbitrationClauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L.
REV. 335, 351 (2007); see also William W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and Finance, 17 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 213, 215-16 (1998) (listing reasons banks historically have preferred courts to
arbitration, but detecting a slight recent trend toward experimenting with arbitration).
22. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 2, at 1563 (describing policy debate).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. See generally Cynthia Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration
Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law (N.Y. Univ. Law
Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 06-20, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=911284
(explaining why these competing concerns call for conditional waivability in the context of
mandatory employment arbitration provisions).
26. See generally Sherwyn et al., supra note 2 (critically analyzing existing empirical
studies). Empirical studies comparing win/loss rates, damages amounts, and/or repeat player
effects include Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration:The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997); Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion
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pending in Congress that would prohibit the enforcement of
mandatory arbitration clauses in all employment contracts. 27
Whatever the merits of the debate over employment arbitration
generally, the concerns of employer overreaching are much weaker for
CEO employment contracts, the subject of this Article. CEOs have
more bargaining power than do workers on the lower rungs of the
corporation, and they are much more likely to be represented by
lawyers who help them negotiate the individual employment
provisions. 28 There is evidence that this additional bargaining power
enables CEOs to avoid mandatory arbitration clauses in at least some
cases in which the clauses might be undesirable for them. Although as
many as 79 percent of surveyed companies report using employment
arbitration, 29 less than 42 percent of studied companies included
arbitration clauses in their CEO employment contracts. 30 If these
reports are accurate evidence, then CEOs might instead use their
enhanced bargaining power to obtain desired benefits from
arbitration.
Other empirical studies have focused on CEO employment
contracts. For example, at least one study focuses on the extent to
which the presence of a lawyer as negotiating agent influences the

Employment Disputes? An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT.
369 (1995); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in
Judicial Review of Employment ArbitrationAwards, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998); Samuel
Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment
ArbitrationAgreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559 (2001); Elizabeth Hill, Due Process
at Low Cost:An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American
Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 777 (2003); William M. Howard,
Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination,DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40; Lewis
L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitrationand Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 29 (1998); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation:
An Empirical Comparison (N.Y. Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 65, 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=389780.
27. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong bills&docid=f:sl782is.txt.pdf. Note that this Act would still
enable parties to decide, after the dispute arises, that they wish to arbitrate their disputes. At
that point, the decision is more likely to be fully informed.
28. Indeed, some have claimed that CEOs' interests are far better represented than firms'
interests in contract negotiations. For a survey of the literature and an empirical study of
differences in contract terms for CEOs represented by "super-lawyer" agents, see generally Shiva
Rajgopal et al., Do Professional Negotiators Extract Rents on Behalf of Their Client CEOs? (July
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
29. Alternative Dispute Resolution: Most Large Employers Prefer ADR as Alternative to
Litigation,Survey Says, 93 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-4 (May 14, 1997).
30. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 9, at 257 (finding that 41.6 percent of contracts opted for
arbitration).
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substantive terms of the contract. 31 Another study notes that fewer
than half of S&P 500 firms have written contracts with their CEOs
and, as a result, investigates the factors that influence the likelihood
that CEO employment terms will be reduced to writing.32 Firms with
less independent boards, poor recent operating performance, CEOs
hired from outside the company, participation in homogenous
industries, lower stock market volatility, and/or lower industry-wide
survival rates are all more likely to enter into a written employment
contract with their CEOs than are other firms. 33
A third study investigates common substantive provisions
found in CEO employment contracts. 34 That study finds that the most
common contract durations were three or five years, 3 5 and the
contracts very often limited early termination of the CEO to "just
cause" situations, the most common of which were willful misconduct,
moral turpitude, failure to perform duties, breach of fiduciary duties,
and gross misconduct. 36 About two-thirds of the contracts included
noncompetition clauses that restricted the CEO's ability to work for a
competitor firm for some period of time after leaving the company. 37
This third study is the only one that even looks for the presence of
arbitration clauses, 38 though it explores neither the predictors of their
use nor the particular contours of the clauses themselves. To our
knowledge, we are the first to undertake such an investigation.
A final set of studies have examined the use of arbitration
clauses in commercial disputes. In international commerce,
arbitration experts estimate that approximately 90 percent of
international commercial contracts contain arbitration clauses. 3 9 In
contrast, a study of contracts filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission found virtually no arbitration clauses in credit
commitments, underwriting agreements, pooling and servicing

31. Rajgopal et al., supra note 28.
32. Stuart L. Gillan, Jay C. Hartzell & Robert Parrino, Explicit vs. Implicit Contracts:
Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements 1 (July 4, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=687152.
33. Id. at 23-25.
34. Schwab & Thomas, supranote 9.
35 Id. at 247.
36 Id. at 248-49.
37 Id. at 254.
38 Id. at 257-58.
39.

KIAus PETER

BERGER,

INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC

ARBITRATION

8

n.62

(1993);

Alessandra Casella, On Market Integration and the Development of Institutions: The Case of
InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 155, 156-57 (1996); Commentary, in
TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 57, 59

(Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) [hereinafter TOWARDS A SCIENCE].
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agreements, security agreements, and trust agreements formed
between U.S. parties. 40 These studies seem to show that context
matters in the selection of arbitration clauses.
B. Why Arbitrate Employment Contract Disputes?
Let us imagine that both parties negotiating a contract have
equal bargaining power-as may be the case with CEOs and their
employers. When might the parties opt for arbitration? Many of the
rationales for arbitration or litigation cannot be studied empirically.
But this Section and the next nevertheless provide the reader with a
general sense of some of the factors that can influence contracting
parties' decisions about how to handle future disputes.
First, parties might opt for arbitration in order to have their
disputes resolved by individuals with technical, industry, or (in the
case of CEOs) compensation expertise. 41 Courts typically possess
expertise in legal doctrine, but they are generalists and thus often
know little to nothing about trade usage or other commercial features
surrounding the parties' contract. If the parties care more about
business expertise than they do about legal expertise, they might opt
for arbitration. Parties who place strong emphasis on expertise might
also specify that any arbitrator ultimately chosen have a particular
background or type of experience. 42 The demand for trade expertise
might increase with the frequency and importance of vague or
complicated terms.
Second, parties might choose arbitration in order to keep
disputes and the information relevant to them secret. Arbitration is
more private than litigation because case-relevant evidence is not
submitted to juries, court clerks, government officials, the press, or
other uninvited third parties, and arbitration usually concludes

40. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 21; see also Park, supra note 21, at 232-37 (discussing
arbitration in the securities context).
41. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & SCH. OF INT'L ARBITRATION, QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF
LONDON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2008, at 2 (2008),
http://www.pwc.co.uk/pdflPwCInternational_- Arbitration_2008.pdf (survey of lawyers involved
in transborder transactions listing "depth of expertise of arbitrators" as one of the top reasons for
choosing arbitration).
42. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Clauses in Franchise Agreements: Common
(and Uncommon) Terms, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 81, 82 (2002) (finding, in a survey of franchise
contracts, that some arbitration provisions required that the arbitrator have experience in
franchising law, some required experience in franchise arbitration, and some required experience
in either the franchise industry or the particular line of business in which the franchise was
engaged).
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without a written opinion. 43 Although no legal rule requires
individuals to keep knowledge of an arbitrated matter confidential,44
some arbitration associations impose a duty of confidentiality on the
arbitrators. 45 Parties can, and often do, contractually promise to keep
arbitration-relevant information confidential. Thus, firms that are
more dependent on confidential information (such as research and
development or trade secrets) might prefer to maximize their ability to
resort to arbitration. Other firms may just prefer not to air their dirty
laundry in public.
Third, parties might prefer arbitration as a cheaper and
quicker form of dispute resolution. Historically, arbitration involved
less discovery, fewer motions, less elaborate trials, and judgments
without written opinions. More recently, however, arbitration
proceedings have increasingly begun to look more like formal court
proceedings. Indeed, a recent survey of contracting parties indicated
that arbitration is no longer perceived to be a relatively cheap form of
dispute resolution. 46 That said, however, parties can agree to informal
and quick arbitration, and they can threaten to fire arbitrators who
will not comply with their wishes. 47 Where it matters, then,
arbitration can be both cheaper and quicker than litigation. More
generally, parties can customize the procedural rules that will apply to
their dispute resolution if they opt for arbitration.
Fourth, parties might prefer arbitration as a less adversarial
form of dispute resolution. Informal dispute resolution makes it easier
for the parties to continue their relationship while their dispute is
being resolved. 48 Because arbitration is quicker, it may not entail the
intensive involvement of lawyers and may better enable creative
compromise solutions. Thus, parties in long-term relationships might
prefer to resolve their disputes outside of court.49
43. Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV.
1211, 1215-17 (2006).
44. Id. at 1218.
45. Id. at 1219 n.48 (listing the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures and
the National Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure as examples).
46. See Christian Biuhring-Uhle, A Survey on Arbitration and Settlement in International
Business Disputes, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE, supra note 39, at 25, 33 (51 percent of those surveyed
thought that arbitration yields no cost advantage over litigation).
47. ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 93-94 (2009).
48. See DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, CORNELL/PERC INST. ON CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE
GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 17 (1998), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.
cornell.edu/icrpubs/4 (stating that 41.3 percent of companies surveyed used arbitration because
it "preserves good relationships").
49. More recently, however, arbitration has become more adversarial. THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 13 (3d ed.
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Fifth, some parties prefer to avoid juries. Some fear that their
wealth might create an excuse for jurors to rule against them. Others
engage in business practices that will make jurors skeptical. And still
others anticipate that their disputes might involve complicated
scientific or mathematical concepts that are difficult for jurors to fully
understand. Juries can be avoided in the courtroom, too, because jurywaiver provisions in contracts are enforceable in almost all the
states.5 But if the parties are worried about having to litigate claims
in the few states that will not enforce jury waivers, or if the parties
want to avoid juries and obtain other benefits that arbitration can
provide, then they are more likely to opt for arbitration.5 1
Sixth, arbitration better enables the parties to customize
monetary damage awards. 52 Liquidated damages provisions are more
likely to be respected, as are contract clauses that preclude the
recovery of punitive damages or otherwise limit recoverable
damages. 53 Similarly, the parties might be better able to shift the cost
of the prevailing party's attorneys' fees onto the losing party by opting
for arbitration. 54
Seventh, arbitration can better enable contracting parties to
choose their own governing laws. To be sure, choice-of-law provisions
are commonly enforced in courts too, but court enforcement of choiceof-law clauses is typically limited by a public policy exception that can
create costly uncertainty for parties who care that a particular law be
applied or avoided.55 Arbitration also better enables parties to choose
private law to resolve their disputes. 56
2002). As a result, parties who desire less adversarial dispute resolution might have to contract
for it, either by selecting an arbitration association committed to less adversarial dispute
resolution, or through customized procedures, timing of dispute resolution, etc.
50. Predispute jury waivers are enforceable everywhere in the United States except Georgia
and California. Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the
Rules ofLitigation in Arbitration'sImage, 30 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579, 604 n.107 (2007).
51. Interestingly, some company franchise agreements include an arbitration provision but
also provide that the franchisee instead can sue in courts, provided that the franchisee waives
any right to a jury trial or to punitive damages. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R.
Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration? 7-8 n.24 (Aug. 11, 2008), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1147697 (quoting language from Baskin Robbins and Dunkin' Donuts standard
franchise agreements).
52. O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 47, at 94.
53. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
695, 737-38 (finding, in a study of seventy-five franchise agreements, that about 75 percent of
contracts opting for arbitration also precluded relief for punitive damages).
54. Id. at 735.
55. See, e.g., O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 47, at 40-41 (describing the lack of
predictability of the public policy exception to the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses).
56. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal ContractualRelations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 126 (1992) (stating that Diamond Dealers Club
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As mentioned above, the current use of arbitration clauses in
CEO employment contracts might represent an equilibrium situation,
but it might instead represent a point along the path toward routine
use of arbitration. Even in the latter situation, however, the salience
of potential disputes could be an indicator of the relative timing of the
switch from courts to arbitration. Thus, as an eighth and final
predictor of the use of arbitration, parties that anticipate a greater
likelihood of disputes may be more likely to opt for arbitration. In the
context of CEO employment contracts, a greater likelihood of
employment disputes might be associated with such features as (1) a
longer contract term, (2) industries with greater merger or turnover
activity, (3) firms with poor or erratic performance, (4) firms that have
experienced protracted disputes with former CEOs, (5) firms with
more independent boards, and (6) contracts with vaguer performance
terms.

C. Why Might the PartiesPrefer to Litigate?
Alternatively, in our world of equal bargaining power, the
contracting parties might prefer litigation to arbitration for at least
four reasons. First, parties who anticipate a need for injunctive or
preliminary remedies may ultimately need to resort to courts to obtain
easily enforceable orders.57 If so, then the parties might decide simply
to stay in court rather than involve both courts and arbitrators in the
resolution of their disputes. In particular, parties who need to enforce
intellectual property rights, freeze assets, or otherwise act to preserve
the availability of witnesses, evidence, or confidentiality might prefer
to stick with courts. Thus, we might expect to see litigation carve-outs
for these types of issues even in contracts that otherwise provide for
arbitration.
Second, parties who seek legal or precedential expertise (as
opposed to industry or technical expertise) might prefer courts to
arbitration. Lenders and other commercial parties might wish to
resolve their disputes in New York courts, corporate officers and
arbitration "resolves disputes on the basis of trade customs and usages"); Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1772 (1996) (describing the National Grain and Feed
Association's substantive rules). Outside of industry-specific arbitration, however, relatively few
contracting parties appear to want transnational laws applied to their disputes. See Int'l
Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 16/1, at 11 (2005) (reporting
that only eight of the 561 contracts associated with new arbitration filings in 2004 requested
transnational rules).
57. See Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 51, at 8-9 & n.33 (discussing arbitration in
franchise agreements).
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directors might prefer that some disputes be resolved in Delaware
courts, etc. Because arbitrators are not chosen until after the dispute
arises and are typically chosen jointly from among many possible
options (or assigned by the dispute resolution association), the parties
might be more assured of getting the legal expertise they desire by
instead opting for a particular court.58
Third, if a firm has stronger bargaining power relative to its
CEO, it might insist on court resolution of their disputes in cases in
which the firm makes a significant contribution to its home state's
economy. The smaller the state, and the larger the company, the
greater the likelihood that the courts would be expected to exhibit a
hometown bias. Put simply, large firms in small states provide a
critical employment and tax base to the state, and the judges may be
reluctant to decide cases that could have negative effects on those
companies. To the extent that the company can dictate the dispute
resolution forum, these firms will choose courts. Conversely, where
CEOs possess relatively stronger bargaining power, they might be
more likely to insist on arbitration at larger firms in smaller states.
Finally, firms might prefer courts to arbitration in those
contexts in which potential liabilities are massive. For "bet the
company" stakes, arbitration appears to pose more risk because courts
are, on the whole, unable to scrutinize an arbitrator's decisions.59 With
court resolution of these very large-scale disputes, more meaningful
appeal (and possible overturning of the verdict) is possible. However,
"bet the company" litigation is unlikely to occur in the context of CEO
employment contracts.
D. What Would Workers Prefer?
Under the strong version of the contracts-of-adhesion theory,
we would expect to see companies always select arbitration in order to
deprive workers of any right to litigate job-related claims. However,
this supposes that no employees have sufficient bargaining power to
negotiate for variations of these clauses.
In negotiations where the parties have equal bargaining power,
such as those between CEOs and their employers, we would expect
arbitration clauses only as an efficient outcome of arms' length
negotiations. As we saw in Parts II.B and II.C above, context matters.
Sometimes a worker will want to arbitrate a dispute, while other
58. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 47, at 91-92 (arguing that arbitrators have industry
expertise that judges lack).
59. Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 51, at 9.
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times she may prefer litigation. Companies face similar choices. This
means that to uncover patterns we will need to sort out the underlying
choices empirically and see whether the parties follow clear paths in
certain situations.
III. SHAREHOLDERS VERSUS

CEOS: OPTIMAL CONTRACTING OR BOARD
CAPTURE?

The executive compensation literature raises a second set of
issues about arbitration provisions. By examining the determinants of
arbitration clauses in CEO employment contracts, we can indirectly
test the board capture theory's prediction that board composition or
CEO background are important determinants of a CEO's contractual
relationship with her firm. We also can test the optimal contracting
theory's prediction that only economic variables related to the demand
for labor will affect the contents of CEO employment contracts. We
begin by briefly describing the main features of the two theories and
then drawing out some testable hypotheses.

A. Board Capture Theory
Board capture theorists claim that American CEOs largely
appoint friends and obedient subordinates as directors. In their view,
boards are comprised of compliant "yes-men." Compensation
committees are composed of current or former CEOs who bend over
backwards to award CEOs whatever amounts of pay they request. The
compensation
typically
advisors,
committee's
compensation
consultants from firms with serious conflicts of interest, collude by
ensuring that directors rely upon well-massaged industry surveys of
pay levels that lead to benchmarks that favor constantly ratcheting
executive pay levels upward.60
As American CEO pay levels have risen over the past two
decades, this theory has gained many adherents both inside and
outside of the academy. 61 Executive compensation has been painted as
the symbol of out-of-control greed in corporate America. People want
to believe that American CEOs have been playing a one-sided game
60. See John M. Bizjak, Michael L. Lemmon & Lalitha Naveen, Does the Use of Peer
Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and Less Efficient Compensation? 13-15 (Mar. 2007), available
at http:lssrn.comlabstract=252544 (finding that competitive benchmarking in setting executive
pay increases executive pay levels); see also Ronald C. Anderson & John M. Bizjak, An Empirical
Examination of the Role of the CEO and the Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive
Pay, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1323, 1332 (2003) (finding that adding independent directors to
Compensation Committees does not reduce executive pay levels).
61. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, 23-44.

976

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:4:959

and winning without really having to work hard for their pay. Board
capture theory provides an argument supporting these claims.
Board capture theory predicts that a CEO's power over her
board of directors will have an important effect on the terms of her
employment relationship. One measure of CEO power includes
whether the board is primarily comprised of independent directors or
whether it has a majority of inside directors. Another measure
includes whether the CEO is a founder of the company, and therefore
has a longstanding relationship with the board. These variables
should be important predictors of the contents of the CEO's
compensation and employment contract provisions.
B. Optimal ContractingTheory
The competing theory, which has been called optimal
contracting theory, posits that CEO contracts are designed to
maximize shareholder value net of contracting and transaction costs.
An optimal contract "maximizes the net expected economic value to
shareholders after transaction costs (e.g., contracting costs) and
payments to employees. An equivalent way of saying this is that ...
contracts minimize agency costs." 6 2 Optimal does not mean perfect; it
means the best contract that can be achieved to maximize shareholder
value given the contracting costs in a given situation.
Optimal contracting theorists do not claim that U.S. corporate
governance is perfect. Rather, they believe that it may be extremely
good given the existence of information costs, transaction costs, and
the existing U.S. legal and regulatory system. Improved regulation, or
other changes to the contracting environment, could lower contracting
costs and improve overall governance by, for example, making boards
more independent and effective monitors.
For our purposes, optimal contracting theory predicts that "the
economic determinants of the level of compensation (such as the size
of the organization, contemporaneous firm performance, firm risk, and
firm investment opportunity set) should completely describe the crosssectional variation in the equilibrium level of CEO compensation." 63
Employment contracts are part of the contracting relationship
between CEOs and their firms and can be analyzed in the same
manner as compensation arrangements under optimal contracting
62. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation and
Incentives: A Survey, ECON. POL'Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, available at http://www.newyorkfed.
org/research/epr/03vO9nl/0304core.pdf.
63. Core et al., supra note 8, at 375.
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theory. In other words, no board structure variables, or other proxies
for CEO power, should have any significance in explaining CEO
compensation or contract structure under optimal contracting theory.
We develop these hypotheses in Part V below.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA

Before turning to our discussion of the employment contracts
that provide the basis for our empirical analysis, we should note a
limitation on our analysis. We can only observe the outcomes of the
negotiations that take place between boards and CEOs, and we
therefore lack any direct measure of their respective negotiating
strengths. What we are able to observe is how much these contracts
deviate from the average contract in our database. Coupled with some
general information about when CEOs want arbitration and when
firms want it, discussed above, this gives us some basis to draw
conclusions. Even here, though, we must be cautious, as these
negotiations cover all aspects of the employment relationship, and the
parties may agree to give up something in one area of the contract in
order to obtain concessions on other terms. With this caveat in mind,
we turn to our sample construction.
In order to conduct empirical testing, we needed to generate a
sample of CEO employment contracts. We began by creating a list of
companies that were included in the S&P 1500 from 1995 to 2005.
Using this list, we examined each company's mandatory securities law
filings under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act in the SEC's EDGAR
database. We employed a privately owned version of this database,
LiveEdgar, for ease of manual and electronic search techniques.
Using LiveEdgar, we checked each company's Form 10-K
(annual report) filings to see if the company had attached copies of its
CEO's employment contract as an exhibit. If they exist, these
contracts are required disclosures for every registered company.
Whenever we found one of the contracts, we downloaded it and coded
it using a coding system that we created in order to gather the
requisite information. We found a total of 1,970 contracts in this
search. Table 1 displays a summary of how we arrived at the final
sample used in this Article.
There are several different variations in the type of CEO
employment contracts that we found. 64 The three most important
64. We make no attempt to include all of the other various contractual agreements that
exist between CEOs and their firms. For example, we do not include change-of-control
agreements in our sample, although some of these agreements include arbitration provisions. We
recognize that these other forms of agreement may affect the employment relationship between
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contract types are initial contracts, contract amendments, and
restated contracts. Initial contracts are those that are entered into
between the company and its new CEO, or in some cases, by a
company and its current CEO where the firm's prior relationship with
the CEO was not the subject of a written employment contract.
Generally, CEOs and firms enter into initial contracts at the
beginning of their employment relationships.
Contract amendments can be initiated at any time for any
reason once an employment contract is in place. They are typically
quite short and affect only a few terms of the initial (or restated)
contract, usually specifying changes in the CEO's compensation
arrangement. They rarely alter any noncompensation-related terms of
the employment relationship. We did not find a single case where
these amendments altered the arrangements, or lack thereof,
providing for arbitration of any dispute between the parties. For this
reason, we decided to drop these contract amendments from our
sample. This decision reduced our sample by 1,052 observations.
Restated contracts (sometimes called "amended and restated
contracts") are contracts that are entered into subsequent to the initial
contract, usually after one or more amendments have been made to
the initial contract. A restated contract incorporates all of the changes
made in the various amendments, and it also frequently adds new
terms. This new, integrated document reflects all of the terms of the
employment contract between the CEO and the firm. We included
these agreements in our sample for two reasons. First, in some
instances, the initial contracts are unavailable.65 Second, restated
contracts could result in changes to the arbitration arrangements to
the parties' agreement.
Next, to test the hypotheses formulated later in the Article, we
needed to obtain some additional information about the CEOs and
their companies. We used the ExecuComp database to collect
information about each CEO's total compensation, including the
amount of her incentive-based pay, the percentage of independent
directors on each firm's board, and the type of CEO at the firm (i.e.,
insider, outsider, or founder). Total compensation is comprised of the
following items: salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value
of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options (using the
the firm and its managers, but have decided to leave them for a later day in order to maintain
our focus on employment contracts.
65. This could arise if the initial contracts were entered into prior to May 6, 1996, when the
SEC mandated that all companies file electronically on the EDGAR database, or if the company
failed to disclose an earlier contract. We searched diligently to find all prior contracts to confirm
wherever possible if they contained an arbitration clause.
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Black-Scholes option-pricing formula), long-term incentive payouts,
and all other compensation paid by the company. We then adjusted
total compensation from nominal to real terms (year-2000 dollars)
using the Consumer Price Index. We defined incentive-based pay as
all compensation other than salary and bonus. We were forced to drop
an additional 266 contracts from our sample because we could not
match them with the ExecuComp database coverage and therefore
could not obtain complete compensation data for these CEOs for our
analysis.
Finally, we used the Compustat database to collect information
about firm performance and to determine in which state each firm's
headquarters were located. The firm performance variables consist of
sales and return on capital, which is defined as net income divided by
capital. Capital consists of the book value of debt and equity as
reported on the firm's balance sheet. Return on capital is then
averaged over the five-year period prior to the start date of the CEO's
compensation contract. Finally, to compute sales per capita, we used
each state's population as taken from the 2000 Census. We dropped an
additional 101 contracts from our sample because complete
information on these terms was not available.
For each employment contract in our sample, we coded the
presence or absence of an arbitration clause. We also coded a wide
variety of additional information about the contents of the arbitration
provision,66 such as whether certain types of disputes were "carved
out" for resolution by litigation. For the purposes of this Article,
though, we are solely concerned with the presence or absence of an
arbitration provision.
As Table 1 shows, we obtained a final sample of 551 contracts
for which we have complete information about firm characteristics,
executive compensation, and other variables that are important for
our analysis. About half of these contracts contain arbitration
provisions-a proportion that is consistent with the results of an
earlier study by one of the authors of this Article.67
66. We also coded those contracts with arbitration provisions for whether the parties chose
an arbitration association, whether they specified the rules of procedure that arbitration would
follow, whether they chose a specific number of arbitrators to resolve disputes, where they chose
to arbitrate, whether the parties contractually allocated the costs of arbitration, whether they
provided a limitations period for filing for arbitration, whether they addressed rules of discovery
or rules of evidence, whether the arbitrator was contractually prohibited from awarding punitive
damages, whether the parties were bound to keep the contents of arbitration proceedings
confidential, whether the arbitrator was obligated to issue a written opinion justifying her
decision, and whether the parties reserved the right to appeal the arbitrator's decision to the
courts.
67. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 9, at 257-58.
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF CEO CONTRACTS SAMPLE
Description
Initial sample of CEO contracts
Less contracts that are not regular employment
contracts or reinstatements
Less contracts missing variables on ExecuComp
database (total compensation, founder, board
independence, outside CEO)
Less contracts missing data on Compustat
(firm performance or headquarters data)
Net usable contracts

Number of Contracts
1,970
(1,052)

(266)
(101)
551

The contracts in our sample were executed during the time period
between 1995 and 2005, as illustrated in Table 2A. Initially, fewer
contracts exist in the sample for the years 1995 and 1996, perhaps
because EDGAR filings did not become mandatory until May 1996 or
because companies may have taken some time to become accustomed
to having to disclose publicly the intimate details of their CEOs'
financial and legal arrangements. It is also possible, according to some
press reports, that it has become more common for CEOs to have
employment contracts with their firms. 68 Such a trend may result
because these disclosure requirements have caused CEOs and firms to
become more aware that other firms are employing such contracts. 69
Or perhaps CEO job tenure has been declining over this time period.7 0

68. Rachel Emma Silverman, Your Career Matters: The Jungle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2000,
at B16 (reporting trend toward increased usage of employment contracts for CEOs).
69. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1041-42 (1999) (arguing that CEOs feel social
pressure to keep up with their peers in compensation); see also James Ang et al., Is There a
Social Circle Premium in CEO Compensation? 20-21 (June 25, 2009), available at
http://www.fma.org/Prague/Papers/Is-there_a_SocialCirclePremium_inCEO_Compensation.p
df ("[The intensity of pay comparisons increases with the amount of available information on
peer pay.").

70.

Robert Weisman, Being a CEO Has Its Perks, But Tenure Isn't One of Them, BOSTON

GLOBE, May 11, 2008, at G1 (reporting that average CEO job tenure dropped from 9.7 years in
1999 to 8.3 years in 2006, while median job tenure in 2006 was only 5.5 years).
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TABLE 2A: TIME SERIES OF CEO CONTRACTS: 1995-2005
Contracts
Percent of
with no
contracts
containing arbitration
arbitration provisions
provisions

Year

Total

Initiation of
contracts
containing
arbitration
provisions

Renewal of
contracts
containing
arbitration
provisions

1995

10

3

2

50.0%

5

1996

21

7

1

38.1%

13

1997

39

11

3

35.9%

25

1998

45

18

4

48.9%

23

1999

53

22

2

45.3%

29

2000

58

22

5

46.6%

31

2001

79

36

5

51.9%

38

2002

67

25

11

53.7%

31

2003

67

26

11

55.2%

30

2004

64

32

3

54.7%

29

2005

48

21

8

60.4%

19

Total

551

223

55

50.5%

273

The next-to-last column of Table 2A shows the percentage of
contracts containing arbitration provisions. Whereas a total of 50.5
percent of the contracts in our sample include an arbitration
provision, this overall average masks an upward trend in the use of
arbitration over time-from a low of 35.9 percent of contracts in 1997
to a high of 60.4 percent of contracts in 2005. A simple linear
regression of the percentage of contracts containing arbitration
provisions each year against time indicates a statistically significant
upward slope.7 1 This trend indicates a possible transition toward a
new equilibrium situation where arbitration is more commonly
employed than in the past.

71.

The t-statistic on the slope is 3.84.
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TABLE 2B: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS WHERE FIRM HAD AN
ARBITRATION CONTRACT IN A PRIOR CEO's AGREEMENT
Arbitration in prior year contract

Arbitration in
sample contract

Total

Yes

No

Yes
No

113
18

165
255

278
273

1 Total

131

420

551

In Table 2B, we examine whether prior employment contracts
between the company and its previous CEO contained arbitration
provisions. We do so to determine if the presence of an arbitration
provision in the contract of the prior CEO is more likely to result in an
arbitration provision in the contract of the CEO in our sample. This
might occur, for example, when the employer uses the prior contract
as a model for the current CEO's contract, and that clause is simply
carried over to the next CEO. This example is consistent with what
practitioners in the area tell us is common practice.
To test the significance of these differences, we calculated a
chi-square statistic to test the null hypothesis of independence
between the two classifications (i.e., the existence of an arbitration
provision in a contract and the existence of an arbitration contract in a
prior CEO's contract at the same firm). The result was highly
statistically significant. 72 This finding supports the hypothesis that
the inclusion of an arbitration provision in a prior CEO's contract is
likely to increase the probability that such a clause will exist in the
next CEO's contract. We therefore need to control for this variable in
our multivariate analysis later in the Article.
One obvious implication of these descriptive results is that the
parties do not always choose either arbitration or litigation.
Companies are unable to unilaterally impose arbitration provisions on
CEOs, contrary to the claims of proponents of the strong form of the
contracts of adhesion argument. We conclude that our evidence does
not support this strong form argument. Given the wide dispersion of
outcomes, we turn next to formulating and testing hypotheses about
why firms and CEOs agree to include arbitration provisions in their
executive employment agreements.

72.

The chi-square test value is 88.14, which is significant with a p-value less than 0.0001.
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V. HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION AND TESTING
The analysis above can help us to formulate and test some
hypotheses regarding the inclusion of arbitration clauses in CEO
contracts. Recall that when a contract does not contain a binding
arbitration clause, the parties have retained their rights to have
future disputes resolved in courts. The presence of an arbitration
clause, by contrast, represents an affirmative choice by the parties to
have some or all of their disputes resolved by arbitrators rather than
by courts. Given the above factors, then, when might we predict CEO
employment contracts to include arbitration clauses? In the following
section, we develop our hypotheses and conduct some univariate tests
on them. Part V.B then incorporates these results into a multivariate
model.
A. Univariate Tests
1. Arbitration and CEO Pay Levels and Composition

Our first hypothesis is that, all else equal, CEOs receiving
higher pay are more likely to prefer arbitration than their lower-paid
counterparts if they think that their high compensation would cause
jurors to be unsympathetic to their claims. Companies might also
prefer arbitration of this question if they are concerned about keeping
otherwise private information about CEO compensation from entering
the public domain. While many elements of CEO compensation are
publicly disclosed, there may be documents related to its

determination (or other aspects of pay that are highly correlated with
total amount, such as the size of supplemental retirement plans) that
are not publicly known. For these reasons, both parties to the contract
may prefer arbitration, which leads us to our first hypothesis.
HI: More highly compensated CEOs are more likely to have contracts that include an
arbitration provision.

Table 3 displays the mean and median total CEO compensation
for CEOs who have contracts with arbitration clauses (about $5
million annually) and for those who do not have contracts with
arbitration clauses (just under $4.2 million per year). Although the
difference in means test is marginally significant at conventional
levels of significance, 73 the test of the difference in medians is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This result is consistent

with our first hypothesis.
73.

The p-value is 0.07.
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TABLE 3: ARBITRATION AND AVERAGE TOTAL CEO COMPENSATION

Description

74

Sample with

Sample with

arbitrationprovision

no arbitrationprovision

Sample size
Mean (median) total CEO
compensation (000s)

278
$5,001.5
($3,215.2)

t-statistic (p-value)

1.79

z-statistic (p-value)

2.20 (0.03)

273
$4,178.7
($2,601.6)

(0.07)

A related claim is that CEOs who receive a larger percentage of
their total compensation in the form of incentive-based pay will be
more likely to seek arbitration. Here the motivation for seeking
arbitration might be to have a compensation expert who understands
the intricacies of incentive-based pay plans resolve any contested
issues between the company and its top executives. One might expect
that both parties to the contract would have an interest in ensuring
that this was done properly and therefore would agree that an
arbitration clause should be included in the contract.
In a related vein, all else equal, parties that have drafted more
complicated or vaguer payment provisions may be more likely to seek
expert arbitrators to resolve their disputes than parties that have
used less complicated payment provisions. Complicated provisions can
result from the use of complex formulas. Vague provisions can take
the form of judgments regarding the CEO's performance-that is,
"exceptional" or "adequate" performance expectations. As stated
earlier, these are situations where arbitrator expertise will be
preferred over generalist judges. Presumably this preference is
mutual. In CEO employment contracts, incentive-based pay is more
likely to be complicated than non-incentive-based pay. This leads to
our second hypothesis.
H2: CEOs who receive a greater percentage of their compensation in the form of
incentive pay are more likely to have an employment contract with an arbitration
clause.

In our analysis, incentive pay is defined as all compensation
other than the CEO's annual salary and bonus. Although this may be

74. In each table, we show the number of observations in each sample, the mean value of
each variable with the median value in parentheses directly below the mean, the t-statistic for a
test of the difference in means with the p-value based on a 2-tailed test of the null hypothesis of
no difference in means, and finally a z-statistic for a Wilcoxon two-sample test of the difference
in medians with the p-value in parentheses. All tests are run using SAS 9.1 for Windows. The
tests are described in 2 SAS/STAT USER'S GUIDE, VERSION 6 (4th ed. 1990).

2010]

ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CEO CONTRACTS

985

a noisy measure, it is likely that compensation from restricted stock
grants, stock option grants, and long-term incentive pay portions of
the pay package will be substantially higher than other forms of pay
that are neither salary nor bonus. Table 4 shows that the results are
much stronger for Hypothesis 2 than for Hypothesis 1-both the tstatistic and the z-statistic are significant at the 1 percent level. This
result implies that arbitration clauses are more common when CEOs
receive a greater proportion of their pay in incentives.
TABLE 4: AVERAGE PERCENT OF TOTAL CEO COMPENSATION IN THE
FORM OF INCENTIVE PAY

Description
Sample size
Mean (median) percent
of incentive pay
in CEO's total
compensation
t-statistic (p-value)
z-statistic (p-value)

Sample with
arbitrationprovision
278

Sample with
no arbitrationprovision
273

55.3%
(60.1%)

49.3%
(53.3%)

2.66 (0.01)
2.74 (0.01)

To summarize, for both total compensation and the average
percentage of compensation in the form of incentive pay, the evidence
is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. This suggests that more highly
paid CEOs-and CEOs who receive a greater part of their pay in the
form of stock options or other incentive-based pay-are more likely to
seek arbitration clauses in their employment contracts. As to total
compensation, highly paid CEOs might believe that an arbitrator will
be more sympathetic to their claims than a jury, which might find
their pay excessive. From the companies' perspective, they may prefer
to keep nonpublic information about high pay levels private for
proprietary reasons. Turning to incentive pay, these results are
consistent with the claim that an experienced arbitrator is better able
to understand the complexities of determining the appropriate amount
of incentive-based pay. As a result, both parties have an interest in
using an expert arbitrator.
2. Arbitration and Firm Characteristics
A second set of important variables that may affect the
presence of arbitration provisions are the characteristics of the firm
employing the executive. For instance, all else equal, a firm that is a

986
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large employer in its home state may be more likely to prefer court to
arbitral resolution of its disputes, based on the theory that local
judges and juries will be more inclined to favor large local businesses.
Conversely, the CEO of such a company might be reluctant to agree to
go to court in her home state and, if she has sufficient bargaining
power, might demand arbitration. For that reason, we make no
prediction about the direction for this hypothesis.
We confronted two methodological issues in formulating this
hypothesis. First, what is the home state of the firm? Second, how
should we measure the firm's importance to that state? To determine
the home state, we decided to use the state where the firm's executive
headquarters are located, 75 rather than its state of incorporation. We
made this decision primarily because most public corporations are
incorporated in Delaware but do not maintain significant operations
there. Determining the state where the firm has the largest presence
is also a question of judgment. For example, we could measure
employer importance by using firm assets, firm sales, or number of
employees, divided by state population. We chose the second
measure-firm sales per capita-as our measure of a firm's
importance within the state because it is a convenient and widely
reported measure. Our third hypothesis is therefore as follows:
H3: Firms that have higher sales per capita in their home state are less likely to have
arbitration clauses in their CEO's employment contract.

Table 5 shows the results of a two-sample t-test and
nonparametric z-test of this hypothesis.76 The results are mixed. The
t-test does not support our hypothesis, but the z-statistic, which tests
the difference in the medians, does support it. In this case, we are
more inclined to believe the test of medians because the mean of the
sample with arbitration provisions appears to be driven by two
extreme observations.77

75. By this, we mean the state in which the firm's executive headquarters are located and
where it is most likely to employ its largest number of workers and executives.
76. Three observations have missing sales on Compustat.
77. One, Fannie Mae, which is headquartered in Washington, D.C., has sales per capita of
$48.56, while the other is the large grocery chain Albertson's, which is headquartered in Idaho
and has sales per capita of $28.41.
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TABLE 5: AVERAGE SALES PER CAPITA IN HEADQUARTERS STATE AND
THE EXISTENCE OF ARBITRATION PROVISION IN CEO CONTRACT
Description
Sample size
Mean (median) sales
per capita (000,000s)

Sample with
arbitrationprovision
277
$0.7075
($0.1152)

t-statistic (p-value)

0.74 (0.46)

z-statistic (p-value)

-2.70 (0.01)

Sample with
no arbitrationprovision
271
$0.5466
($0.1680)

We interpret these results to be consistent with the hypothesis
that very important local firms will prefer to litigate employment
contract disputes with their CEO, although CEOs will resist doing so.
The fact that the results are significant suggests that the corporations'
preferences on the question prevail.
We next focus on the effects of industry change on CEO
employment contract arbitration clauses. CEOs at firms in industries
that are experiencing rapid changes may prefer to select arbitration as
the dispute resolution mechanism in their contracts because they
believe that it is a quicker method of resolving any problems that
arise. Speed is important to CEOs in rapidly changing industries
because the firm may not continue to exist as an independent entity. If
new owners are put in place, a new board might also be appointed.
The CEO would then face an entirely different adversary with
different motivations, making the outcome of a dispute highly
uncertain.
From the corporation's perspective, it may be willing to
accommodate the CEO's understandable desire for greater certainty
about who will decide her fate because its board may not wish to have
any significant outstanding litigation issues in the event it becomes a
target for merger and acquisition activity. Moreover, if the firm is in
financial distress or in a declining industry where the likelihood of
financial distress is elevated, the firm may be attracted to the
perceived lower cost of arbitration. For these reasons, we formulate
the first version of our fourth hypothesis as follows:
H4: CEO contracts at firms in industries that are experiencing rapid levels of change,
including mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcies, and liquidations, are more likely to
include arbitration clauses.

In Table 6, we show the results of a two-sample t-test and
nonparametric Z-test of the hypothesis that CEO employment
contracts at firms that are in industries experiencing dramatic
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changes are more likely to include arbitration provisions. As a proxy
for industry change, we used the number of companies deleted from
the "active" Compustat set divided by the total number of companies
listed in the company's respective two-digit SIC code from 1988 to
2007. This variable gives us a measure of the likelihood of a firm
within the industry being acquired by another firm, merging with
another firm, experiencing bankruptcy, or undergoing liquidation.
TABLE 6: ARBITRATION AND AVERAGE PERCENT OF COMPANIES WITHIN
AN INDUSTRY SUBJECT TO AN ACQUISITION, MERGER,
BANKRUPTCY, OR LIQUIDATION

Description
Sample size
Average (median) percent
of companies deleted

Sample with
Sample with
arbitrationprovision no arbitrationprovision
278
273
38.08%
36.39%
(36.67%)
(38.28%)

t-statistic (p-value)

2.78 (0.01)

z-statistic (p-value)

2.60 (0.01)

The results are strongly consistent with the hypothesis. Both
the t-statistic and z-statistic on the difference between the two groups
is significant at the 1 percent level.
An alternative measure of firm-level uncertainty is the amount
of variation in the annual sales of its industry. Firms in industries
with higher levels of variation are at greater risk of experiencing
changes to their structure and existence. For the same reasons given
in Hypothesis 4, this increased risk should lead both CEOs and firms
to add arbitration provisions to their employment contracts.
H5: CEO contracts at firms that have higher levels of industry variation in their sales
are more likely to contain arbitration clauses.

Table 7 presents the results from testing Hypothesis 5. It
shows the results of a two-sample t-test and nonparametric z-test of
this hypothesis. Industry uncertainty is measured as the standard
deviation of annual percentage change in industry sales from 1989 to
2006. These results do not support the hypothesis, and the median
results are not in the predicted direction.

2010]

ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CEO CONTRACTS

989

TABLE 7: AVERAGE OF STANDARD DEVIATION OF INDUSTRY SALES

Description
Sample size
Mean (median) of
standard deviation of
industry

Sample with
arbitrationprovision
278
10.91%
(7.48%)

Sample with
no arbitrationprovision
273
9.98%
(7.59%)

sales

t-statistic (p-value)

1.42 (0.16)

z-statistic (p-value)

0.06 (0.95)

Overall, the results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that both CEOs
and corporations prefer to arbitrate their mutual employment
disputes when the firm is in an industry experiencing rapid economic
change. The fact that both parties to the contract have similar
incentives, though perhaps for different reasons, is the most likely
explanation for these patterns. The second set of tests, however, does
not support Hypothesis 5.
Next, CEOs asked to lead firms in industries characterized by
low profitability may be more likely to prefer arbitration. One
argument is that they are more likely to prefer arbitration because
low firm profitability makes the parties more concerned about the
high costs of litigation. Arbitration is perceived to be less expensive,
and every dollar counts at low-profit firms. Alternatively, we would
argue that when external conditions surrounding the firm are
verifiably adverse, such as poor profits or rapidly changing industry
conditions, the parties anticipate a greater likelihood of disputes
arising out of the employment relationship that are not the fault of
either party. To address this risk, the parties signal their commitment
to performance by negotiating an arbitration clause in an effort to try
to resolve disputes amicably.78 Given the long lead times between
contract execution and potential disputes, we expect that sustained
profitability should have a stronger effect, so we use a measure of
long-term profits at the time of the contract.
H6: Contracts with arbitration
profitability.

clauses

are characterized

by firms

with lower

The results in Table 8 support this hypothesis. We see a strong
relationship between the use of arbitration clauses and lower five-year

78. This rationale would also apply to Hypothesis 3 above. We thank Professor Geoffrey
Miller for this insight.
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average return on capital.79 This finding supports our belief that CEOs
at weaker companies seek to include arbitration clauses in their
contracts for two potential reasons. First, arbitration clauses may
facilitate a cheaper resolution of any disputes, which should be
important at firms where cost containment is of primary importance.
Second, arbitration clauses send a positive signal that the contracting
parties will agree to arbitration in a situation where adverse external
factors are ex ante the most likely cause of their disagreement. An
examination of the data shows that the results do not appear to be
driven by extreme outliers.
TABLE 8: FIRM PROFITABILITY AND ARBITRATION PROVISIONS

Description
Sample size

Mean (median) five-year
average return
on

Sample with

Sample with

arbitrationprovision

no arbitrationprovision

276

269

6.38%
(7.45%)

9.33%
(8.13%)

capital

t-statistic (p-value)

2.45 (0.01)

z-statistic (p-value)

1.63 (0.10)

3. Contract Length and Arbitration
We might also think that certain contract provisions would
affect the likelihood that the parties will include an arbitration
provision. For instance, all else held constant, parties contemplating a
longer relationship may be more likely to want to resolve their
disputes through arbitration than those contemplating a shorter
relationship. This hypothesis stems from the suggestion made earlier
that the informal nature of arbitration better enables parties to
preserve their working relationship notwithstanding the dispute.
Presumably a desire to preserve the working relationship is shared by
the parties. This leads to our seventh hypothesis.
H7: Contracts with longer durations are more likely to include arbitration clauses.

Table 9 provides information on Hypothesis 7.80 We also show
the results of a two-sample t-test and z-statistic of the hypothesis.
79. We did a sensitivity analysis with several different measures of long-term profitability
to see if this result was robust. We found similar results using three-year average return on
capital and also using return on assets.
80. Note that contract lengths were unavailable for 134 of our observations.
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Description
Sample size
Mean (median) length
of CEO contract
(in

Sample with
arbitrationprovision
223
3.32
(3.00)

991

CEO CONTRACT
Sample with
no arbitrationprovision
195
3.34
(3.00)

years)

t-statistic (p-value)

-0.18 (0.86)

z-statistic (p-value)

0.03 (0.98)

We find no support for Hypothesis 7. We find this quite
surprising, as we anticipated that parties entering into long-term
agreements would want to resolve disputes informally to preserve
their working relationship. However, there does not appear to be a
strong desire by either party to do so. We offer two possible
explanations for why our hypothesis lacks support. First, it is likely
that contract length is less important than the length of severance
payments, in terms of the actual economic significance of the CEO's
contract to the firm. The firm is always able to terminate a CEO
without cause, no matter how long the contract, as long as it is willing
to pay the full amount of the CEO's severance pay. Second, most
disputes between CEOs and their firms are likely over termination
payments to the CEO once the employment relationship ends, perhaps
minimizing any interest the parties have in maintaining an amicable
long-term relationship.
4. Arbitration and CEO Power
Board capture theory predicts that a CEO with greater control
over her board of directors will have more control over the contents of
her employment contract. This would lead us to expect that CEOs who
have insider-dominated boards will be able to decide whether to
include arbitration provisions in their employment contracts. If boards
that are dominated by CEOs are less likely to have legal disputes with
those CEOs, then we would expect greater harmony between the
parties and could predict that they will be more inclined to contract for
arbitration. Our testable hypothesis is:
H8: Greater board independence affects the likelihood that an arbitration clause will
appear in its CEO employment contract.

Table 10 provides information on Hypothesis 8. We also show
the results of a two-sample t-test and z-statistic of the hypothesis.
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TABLE 10: ARBITRATION AND BOARD INDEPENDENCE
Description

Sample size
Average (median)
percent of board
deemed

Sample with
arbitrationprovision

Sample with
no arbitrationprovision

278
68.2%
(70.0%)

273
68.9%
(71.4%)

independent

t-statistic (p-value)
z-statistic (p-value)

-0.52 (0.60)
-0.59 (0.56)

For Hypothesis 8, we see that there is no support for board
capture theory's prediction that board structure will affect the
contents of the CEO's employment contract. However, any effect may
be obscured by other economic variables, so that we will need to
examine potential relationships through multiple regression analysis.
An alternative method of examining the effects of CEO power
is to analyze the relationship between the background of the CEO and
the contract structure. Some commentators claim that founding CEOs
have greater power over their boards of directors because of their longterm relationships with directors.81 Board capture theory predicts that
this power should give these founders greater ability to obtain what
they want in their employment contracts. When CEOs are founders of
the firm, they are likely to be more concerned with preserving
harmony within the firm and therefore more likely to prefer
arbitration. The founder has been with the firm since its inception and
typically has both a large economic stake and a large psychic stake in
its welfare. In economic terms, the CEO has large firm-specific
investments that should lead her to prefer arbitration to litigation to
preserve their value. We therefore posit the following hypothesis:
H9: Contracts with CEO founders are more likely to include arbitration clauses than are
contracts that do not involve founders.

Table 11 presents the results of our tests of this hypothesis. We
note that we have relatively few founders in our sample, with only 6.5
percent of the contracts being in this category. The chi-square statistic
is not statistically significant, indicating that these distributions are
not statistically different. 82 We therefore conclude that there is no
support for this prediction of board capture theory. CEO founders are

81. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 9, at 237-38.
82. For a discussion of this statistic, see generally WILLIAM MENDENHALL & JAMES E.
REINMUTH, STATISTICS FOR MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1974).
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neither more nor less likely to include arbitration clauses in their
contracts.
TABLE 11: FOUNDER CEOs AND ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
Sample with no
arbitrationprovision

16
(2.9%)

19
(3.5%)

35
(6.5%)

262
(47.6%)

254
(46.1%)

516
(93.7%)

278

273

551

(50.5%)

(49.6%)

(100.0%)

Number
(percent) who
are founders
Number
(percent) who
are not
founders
Total
X2 =

Total

Sample with
arbitrationprovision

0.34 (p-value = 0.56)

Finally, one might expect a relationship between the path
taken to the CEO position and the presence of arbitration clauses.
Founders tend to have more bargaining power than outsiders, while
outsiders in turn tend to have greater bargaining power than do
insiders.83 As we discussed above, greater CEO power is more likely to
lead to the inclusion of an arbitration provision. We provide the
hypothesis:
H10: CEOs with more bargaining power are more likely to bargain for arbitration.

Panels A through C of Table 12 are contingency tables of
observed frequencies of different subsamples of our data. Panels A, B,
and C present our tests of three different versions of the bargaining
power hypothesis: Panel A shows outsiders versus insiders and
founders, Panel B compares outsiders and insiders only, and Panel C
compares insiders with founders. The chi-square statistic tests the
null hypothesis of independence among the proportions. If we reject
the null hypothesis (i.e., if the p-value is less than 0.05), then we can
conclude that there is an association between the variables of
interest-for example, whether the CEO is an outsider and whether
the CEO's contract contains an arbitration provision.

83.

Schwab & Thomas, supra note 9, at 237-38.
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CEO POWER AND ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
PANEL A: OUTSIDER CEOs

Sample with no
Sample with
arbitrationprovision arbitrationprovision
120
121

Number
(percent)who
are

Total
241

(22.0%)

(21.8%)

(43.7%)

157

153

310

(28.5%)

(27.8%)

(56.3%)

278
(50.5%)

273
(49.6%)

551
(100.0%)

outsiders

Number
(percent)who

are not
outsiders

Total

X2= 0.01 (p-value = 0.92)
PANEL B: CEOs WHO ARE NOT FROM FOUNDING FAMILY

Sample with No
arbitrationprovision

119
(23.1%)

119
(23.1%)

238
(46.1%)

143
(27.7%)

135
(26.2%)

278
(53.9%)

262
(50.8%)

254
(49.2%)

516
(100.0%)

Number
(percent)who
are

outsiders

Number
(percent)who
are

Total

Sample with
arbitrationprovision

insiders

Total

X2 = 0.11 (p-value = 0.74)
PANEL C: CEOS WHO ARE EITHER INSIDERS OR FROM FOUNDING FAMILY

Number
(percent)who
are

insiders

Sample with

Sample with no

arbitrationprovision

arbitrationprovision

143
(46.1%)

135
(43.6%)

Total
278
(89.7%)
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Number
(percent)who
are from
founding
family
Total
X2=
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14
(4.5%)

18
(5.8%)

32
(10.3%)

157

153

310

(50.7%)

(49.4%)

(100.0%)

0.68 (p-value = 0.41)

None of the chi-square statistics are statistically significant,
which indicates that these distributions are not statistically different.
We therefore conclude that there is no support for either hypothesis.
However, one implication of this finding is that a CEO's bargaining
power does not appear to affect her preference for arbitration
provisions, all else being equal.
B. Multivariate Testing
While the univariate tests are very suggestive of several
important underlying relationships, multivariate regression analysis
ensures that we are controlling for the potential effects of other
variables. In Table 13, we present the results of a multivariate logistic
regression analysis. Our dependent variable is a dummy variable
equal to one if an arbitration clause is present and zero if it is not.
This form of estimation allows us to determine if the presence of any
one of the independent variables increases or decreases the probability
of an arbitration clause being included in a CEO's employment
contract. Our independent variableS84 include all of the variables used

84. The following summarizes the independent variables: "Total Pay" is the total inflationadjusted pay in constant year-2000 thousands of dollars. "Long-Term Pay" is the fraction of
"Total Pay" that is comprised of long-term sources of compensation. "Length" is the length of the
contract in years. "Founder" is 1 if CEO is a founder or member of the founding family.
"Outsider" is 1 if the CEO was not previously employed by the firm. "Board Independence" is the
fraction of the board that is considered independent. "Sales Per Capita" is company sales divided
by the population of the firm's headquarters state. "Industry Uncertainty" is industry
uncertainty as measured by the standard deviation of the annual percentage change in industry
sales over the period from 1989 to 2006. "Industry Change" is industry change as measured by
the percentage of companies in a firm's industry deleted from Compustat due to acquisition,
merger, bankruptcy, or liquidation. "Five-Year Average ROC" is the 5-year average return on
capital beginning with the year prior to the start year of the CEO's contract. "Arbitration in Prior
Contract" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a previous CEO contract at the company included an
arbitration clause, 0 if not. "Year" is equal to the beginning calendar year of the contract.
Regressions (2) and (4) include a dummy variable, "Sales Per Capita Dummy," set equal to 1 for
Fannie Mae and Albertson's, and zero for all other observations, to control for the extreme
outlying observations on "Sales Per Capita."
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in Tables 3 through 12 in order to determine if any of the univariate
results that we found in those tables hold up after controlling for the
other variables.
We estimate four different versions of the model. In versions 1
and 2, we omit the length-of-contract variable because we have fewer
observations on this variable. A smaller sample size could potentially
reduce the power of the tests derived from these results.85 Versions 1
and 3 omit the sales-per-capita dummy variable that we included in
order to control for two large outliers in this variable. Versions 2 and 4
include this control variable.
Version 4 of the model includes all of our potential independent
variables and explains the most variation in the data. We therefore
rely most heavily upon its results but note that our results are robust
to the inclusion or deletion of contract length in versions 1 and 2, and
of the sales-per-capita dummy variable in versions 1 and 3.

85. A substantial number of the contracts in our sample do not have a fixed term.
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TABLE 13: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:

ARB= 1 IF CONTRACT INCLUDES

ARBITRATION CLAUSE,

0 IF NOT

(P-VALUES IN PARENTHESES)

Version

Independent Variables
Intercept
Total Pay
Long-Term Pay

Outsider
Board Independence
Sales Per Capita

(0.77)

(0.37)

(0.65)

(0.99)

0.46
(0.28)

0.37
(0.38)

0.44
(0.36)
-0.06

0.39
(0.43)
-0.08

(0.47)

(0.38)

0.2
(0.66)
0.04
(0.85)
-0.6
(0.43)
0.07
(0.33)

0.22
(0.63)
0.03
(0.9)
-0.57
(0.46)
-0.03
(0.79)
15.16
(0.99)
0.77

-0.07
(0.86)
0.08
(0.71)
-0.58
(0.37
0.02
(0.71)

Sales Per Capita Dummy
Industry Uncertainty
Industry Change
Five-Year Average ROC
Arbitration in Prior Contract
Year
N
Likelihood ratio Chi-Square
(p-value)
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05

(4)

(2)
-55.21
(0.46)
0.00002

Length
Founder

(3)

(1)
-56.16
(0.45)
0.000006

0.92

-0.05
(0.9)
0.04
(0.86)
-0.49
(0.45)
-0.15
(0.21)
18.82
(0.98)
0.94

-21.42
-21.38
(0.81)
(0.81)
-0.00001 0.0000002

0.77

(0.49)

(0.48)

(0.6)

(0.6)

3.30**
(0.02)
-0.02***
(0.01)
2.23***
(0.00)
0.03

3.21**
(0.02)
-0.02**
(0.02)
2.21***
(0.00)
0.03

3.37**
(0.03)
-0.03***
(0.01)
2.32***
(0.00)
0.01

3.34**
(0.03)
-0.03***
(0.01)
2.31***
(0.00)
0.01

(0.47)

(0.47)

(0.82)

(0.82)

415
545
545
114.81*** 118.19*** 89.76***
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)

415
91.01***
(0.00)
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The multivariate results in all four specifications show that
three independent variables are consistently significant across all
specifications: "Industry Change," "Five-Year Average ROC," and
"Arbitration in Prior Contract." The Likelihood Ratio x 2 statistic, which
is a test of goodness-of-fit for the entire regression, is statistically
significant in each of the four regressions.
These results confirm the univariate results from Table 6;
arbitration provisions are more likely in industries undergoing greater
change. Also, arbitration provisions are more likely in firms with worse
long-term performance, as measured by the five-year average return on
capital (as in Table 8). In contrast to the univariate results of Table 3
and Table 4, "Total Pay" and "Long-Term Pay" are not significant in the
multivariate tests. This finding leads us to discount those particular
univariate results. Additionally, none of the variables serving as proxies
for CEO power are significant. However, the presence of an arbitration
clause in the previous CEO's contract is positively and significantly
correlated with the use of an arbitration clause in the next CEO's
contract.
Overall, these results are consistent with the prediction of
optimal contracting theory that only economic variables influence the
contents of the employment relationship between the CEO and her
firm. In particular, measures of firm performance and risk are
important determinants of the presence of an arbitration provision.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this Article, we examine whether and when CEOs as workers
bargain to include arbitration provisions in their employment contracts.
We also ask if CEOs impose their will on the shareholders of their
firms, as assumed by board capture theory. We survey the potential
justifications for why a CEO might seek arbitration and then formulate
a series of testable hypotheses based on these justifications. Using a
large sample of CEO employment contracts, we run univariate and
multivariate analyses of each of these hypotheses and find strong
support for three of them.
First, we find that CEOs in industries experiencing rapid
changes-such as mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcies, or liquidationsare more likely to have arbitration provisions in their contracts. This
finding is consistent with the theory that CEOs want their disputes to
be arbitrated quickly in such situations to help ensure that they do not
face a new decisionmaker in the event of a change in firm ownership.
Second, we find that CEOs at relatively poorly performing firms are
more likely to have arbitration provisions in their agreements. One of
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two possible explanations may explain this finding. One explanation is
that arbitration is perceived to be cheaper than litigation, and cost
savings are important at weaker firms; thus, arbitration clauses are
more common. Alternatively, at poorly performing firms, the
contracting parties may be sending a positive signal of their
commitment to performance of the contract by agreeing to arbitrate
their disputes in a situation where external factors are ex ante the most
likely cause of their disagreement. Third, we find that once an
arbitration clause is inserted into a CEO employment contract, that
clause is very likely to appear in future CEO contracts. This result
could occur because old contracts are used as models for new ones. It
also suggests that companies that use arbitration clauses are likely to
be willing to continue to use them over time.
Our results shed light on two important debates in the legal
literature. First, we can see that not all employment contracts are
contracts of adhesion with arbitration provisions, as predicted by the
strong form of that theory. Rather, the CEO employment contracts
show what all employees' preferences for arbitration provisions might
look like if their bargaining power was relatively equal to that of their
employers. Broadly speaking, we find that despite the purportedly
overwhelming benefits of arbitration (especially in the employment
area), the incidence of arbitration clauses is about even with that of no
arbitration. In other words, when employees and employers have
reasonably equal levels of leverage in contract negotiations, we would
expect arbitration provisions to appear only where CEOs believe that
they are warranted, or at least where they do not strenuously object to
them. The fact that we find arbitration in only half of our large sample
of contracts casts doubt on any claims of the universal superiority of
arbitration as a means of resolving employment disputes.
This mixture of choices between courts and arbitration suggests
that either categorical enforcement or nonenforcement of arbitration
clauses in employment contracts would be unwise. Instead, regulatory
policy surrounding these provisions should be more nuanced, based on
more careful studies of the use of arbitration clauses in employment
contracts generally. Consider, for example, an empirical fact about
these contracts that we have not highlighted so far: nearly half of the
contracts with arbitration clauses included a provision carving out some
claim(s) for resolution by courts. 86 Common examples of carve-outs
include a provision stating that disputes based on the noncompetition
clause or a confidentiality clause could be resolved in courts rather than
86. We found that 127 contracts out of the 273 contracts with arbitration clauses have these
carve-out provisions.
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through arbitration. If the parties themselves are bargaining to give
one of them a right to resort to courts for a subset of possible disputes
that might arise between them, then it also might be appropriate as a
policy matter to enforce arbitration clauses in employment contracts
generally but to prohibit some claims from proceeding to arbitration
(e.g., claims based on civil rights violations). Put differently, proarbitration advocates typically argue that all claims need to be
arbitrated in order for the parties to preserve the value of arbitration.
But the behavior of the parties themselves indicates that they do not
view arbitration as desirable in every situation. Regulatory policy
should take this contracting behavior into account.
Our results also provide some insight into the executive
compensation debate. Optimal contracting theory claims that only
economic factors influence the content of the employment relationship
between firms and their CEOs, whereas board capture theory argues
that measures of a CEO's control over her board of directors should also
be important. Our results are consistent with optimal contracting
theory but not with board capture theory. We find several statistically
significant economic variables that are correlated with the presence of
arbitration provisions, while none of our measures of CEO power are
significant.
Finally, one important extension of these results would be to
look at the content of these arbitration provisions to see how they are
structured. We think it particularly important to know if the rules of
the arbitration are slanted heavily in favor of one side. Furthermore, we
would like to know more about the significant carve-outs from the
arbitration provisions as well as what motivates parties to preserve
particular types of claims for court resolution. These and a host of other
related questions are good subjects for future research.

